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Time for a New Law on Health Care 
Advance Directives 
by 
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER* 
During the last decade, states have enacted three different kinds 
of documents to deal with health care of incompetent patients. The 
legislation's main impetus and central focus have been to provide a 
procedure to approve life support termination in appropriate cases, 
although it also addresses other health care concerns. The earliest of 
the statutes was a natural death act, which authorizes a directive, pop­
ularly called a living will, to physicians. The second was a general 
durable power of attorney, sometimes in the form of a specially crafted 
health care durable power of attorney, which essentially empowers an 
appointed agent to make appropriate decisions for an incompetent 
patient. The agent is bound by directions contained in the appointing 
power. Finally, some states have enacted family consent laws em­
powering others, typically family, to decide health care matters absent 
a directive or power of attorney to guide them. At the end of 1990, 
Congress gave these laws new importance by mandating their obser­
vance. 
The statutes differ; 1 provisions of one form conflict with pro­
visions of another form.2 Most contradictions raise problems, some 
nettlesome, others destructive of important interests. After more than 
a decade of experience with such forms, it is time to review the present 
state of the laws and to coordinate and debug them. In the author's 
view, a single statute incorporating the best of each of the three types 
of law is now in order. This Article suggests guidelines for that effort. 
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University; A.B., J.D. University of Pennsylvania; 
L.L.M., J.S.D. Yale. Professor Alexander has been active in organizations concerned with 
elder law, having chaired the National Senior Citizens Law Center, the A.B.A. and California 
Committees on Legal Problems of the Elderly, and vice-chaired the A.B.A. Commission on 
Legal Problems of the Elderly. He has written two books and numerous articles in the field. 
The author thanks his research assistants, Kathleen Roberts and Stephen K. Meyer, for their 
tireless research in support of this Article. 
1. See Beschle, Autonomous Decisionmaking and Social Choice: Examining the "Right 
to Die," 77 Ky. L.J. 319, 335 (1989). 
2. See generally Waters, Florida Durable Power of Attorney Law: The Need for Reform, 
17 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 519 (1990) (arguing that Florida's durable power of attorney law is 
not in harmony with the 1989 guardianship reforms). 
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The Article builds on the assumption that the state primarily is 
interested in assisting patients to control their own medical destinies. 
Regrettably, it is not clear that all present law is so premised, but there 
are powerful reasons it should be. Paternalism often has been re­
pudiated domestically, but is now on the defensive throughout much 
of the world. 
Human autonomy is expressing itself as a paramount concern even 
in places that would have seemed unlikely spawning grounds just a 
few years ago.3 Whatever else can be concluded about this develop­
ment, it should be recognized that the desire for self-expression is a 
universal trait of overwhelming significance. National paternalism 
stands repudiated despite the substantial efforts of many governments 
to meet the needs of their constituents. The democracy wave has sub­
stituted its amalgam of wills for national planning. 
Within the United States one hardly need compose a brief for self­
governance. This country began as a noble experiment in universal 
suffrage over two hundred years ago. Despite an unswerving devotion 
to democratic principles, however, the country has had to awaken it­
self to the limits of popular participation. For almost a century, blacks 
were disenfranchised;4 for a longer period, the same was true of 
women.S It is not always self-evident that pockets of powerlessness 
remain. 
Among those presently disenfranchised are those said to be in­
competent. Chief in that group are the frail elderly. Of course, because 
the elderly are our parents and friends we have not devised a system 
demonstrably uncaring. We simply have substituted the voices of the 
elderly with that of court appointed agents-normally called guard­
ians, conservators, or a variety of less common names ("conserva­
tors")-allowing the conservators to plan the welfare of their wards. 
Some conservators are deeply sensitive and compassionate. They usu­
ally are shocked when accused of working against the interests of their 
wards. Self-determination, however, is no less desired locally than it 
is nationally. Conservatorship has failed repeatedly. It is in a constant 
state of "reform," but reform does not alter its fatal flaw:6 conser­
vatorship deprives the elderly of their cherished freedom to decide. 
3. See, e.g., Raufman, Tunnel at End oj the Light Jor Eastern Europe; Upheaval in 
Eastern Europe One Year Later, Boston Globe, Oct. 21, 1990, National/Foreign, at 1; 
Reunification oj Germany, L.A. Times, Oct. 17, 1990, at B6, col. 2. 
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (enacted in 1870, disallowing the denial of the right to 
vote based on racial grounds). 
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (enacted in 1920, disallowing the denial of the right to 
vote based on gender). 
6. Alexander, A voiding Guardianship, __ 1. ELDER ABUSE __ (1990) (forthcoming). 
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Conservatorship has failed not only theoretically7 but practically 
as well. Indeed, the abuses of the sixties appear to be the abuses of 
the nineties.8 In the late seventies the author suggested adopting ad­
vance directives as an alternative to depriving people of their deci­
sionmaking authority in the face of their declining capacities.9 An 
advance directive enables a competent person to govern what happens 
after incompetency. 
The idea of the advance directive was to create a document that 
would adopt the free form of contracts and express the wil of its maker 
in the maker's terms.1O What has emerged is far more complicated. 
Government again has asserted itself in the conditions that attach to 
the documents. 
The rationale ,for advance directives is, of course, their enhance­
ment of autonomy: they enable persons to protect their futures by 
foreclosing the plans of others to determine their destinies.ll In that 
respect, they fundamentally differ from conservatorships. Both con­
servatorship and advance directives attempt to deal with problems aris­
ing in a future in which the person is unable to make competent 
decisions. Conservatorship imposes societal solutions and a court ap­
pointed enforcer .12 Advance directives, however, provide either an agent 
to enforce a patient's stated desires or instruct physicians how their 
patient wants to be treated. 
To some extent, forms of directives are a product of their history. 
The earliest type of law enacted to authorize directives, the natural 
death act, was popularly named a living will. The author has referred 
to durable powers of attorney for health care, the next set of direc­
tives, as second generation living wills. The new proposal embodied 
7. As I have written about the abuses of conservatorships for a quarter of a century, I 
shall not repeat the discussion other than to refer the reader to a sampling of prior comments: 
G. ALEXANDER, WRITING A LIVING Wnt: USING A DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY (1988) 
[hereinafter WRITING A LIVING Wnt]; G. ALEXANDER & T. LEWIN, THE AGED AND THE NEED 
FOR SURROGATE MANAGEMENT (1972) [hereinafter SUROGATE MANAGEMENT]; Alexander, Death 
by Directive, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 67 (1988) [hereinafter Death by Directive]; Alexander, 
Premature Probate: A Different Perspective on Guardianship for the Elderly, 31  STAN. L. 
REv. 1003 (1979) [hereinafter Premature Probate]. 
. 
8. Compare SURROGATE MANAGEMENT, supra note 7, at 9 (hypothesizing that "surrogate 
management • • •  is conducted in the specific interest of some person other than the incom­
petent" with Friedman & Savage, Taking Care: The Law of Conservatorship in California, 
61 S. CAL. L. REv. 273, 285 (1988) (noting that conservatorships sometimes are sought to 
protect the interests of the conservator rather than the ward). 
9. See Premature Probate, supra note 7, at 1031.  
10. Id. at 1018. 
11. See id. at 1006. 
12. See, e. g. , CAL. PROB. CODE § 1800.3 (West Supp. 1991) (authorizes court to appoint 
a conservator of the person or estate of an adult). 
758 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42 
in this Article is for a third generation living will incorporating the 
first directive and its improvements. 
Each of the three types of documents has an important function, 
and the three varieties can coexist fairly well despite their independent 
enactments and lack of extensive cross-referencing. Combining their 
provisions into a single law would clarify the alternative methods of 
health care decision making for incompetent persons. 
Following the prominent plight of Karen Quinlan,13 California led 
the country in passing a law designed to allow patients in terminal 
stages of disease to give directives to physicians to inform them of the 
patients' desires concerning life support.14 Currently, natural death 
acts modelled on that law exist in forty-two other states. IS California 
13. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (with 
concurrence of guardian and family, no criminal or civil liability may attach for discontinuation 
of life support of patient in persistent vegetative state upon medical determination of no 
reasonable possibility of recovery and after consultation with hospital ethics committee or 
similar body). 
14. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1990). 
15. See Alabama Natural Death Act, ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-l to 10 (1981); Alaska Rights 
of the Terminally Ill, ALAsKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100 (1990); Arizona Medical Treatment 
Decision Act, ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to 10 (1986 & Supp. 1989); Arkansas Rights 
of the Terminally III or Permanently Unconscious, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -202 
(1987 & Supp. 1989); Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 15 18
101 to 113 (1989 & Supp. 1990); Connecticut Removal of Life Support Systems, CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 19a 570 to -575 (West Supp. 1990); Delaware Patient's Right to Terminate 
Treatment, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983); District of Columbia Natural Death 
Act of 1981, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to 2430 (1989); Florida Right to Decline Life­
Prolonging Procedures, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-.15 (West 1986); Georgia Living Wills Act, 
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 88 4101 to -4112 (Harrison 1986 & Supp. 1989); Hawaii Medical Treatment 
Decisions Act, HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 327D l to -27 (Supp. 1989); Idaho Natural Death Act, 
IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4509 (1985 & Supp. 1990); Illinois Living Will Act, ILL. REv. 
STAT. ch. 110 112, paras. 701 710 (1988); Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures 
Act, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16 8 11 1 to -22 (Burns 1990); Iowa Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, 
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.l-.11 (West 1989); Kansas Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 65-28,101 ,109 (1985); Louisiana Declaration Concerning Life-Sustaining Procedures, LA. 
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299:58.1-.10 (West Supp. 1990); Maine Living Wills, ME. REv. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921-2931 (Supp. 1989); Maryland Life Sustaining Procedures, MD. HEALTH
GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1990); Minnesota Adult Health Care Decisions, MINN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 145B.Ol .17 (West Supp. 1990); Mississippi Withdrawal of Life-Saving Me­
chanisms, MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41 101 to -121 (Supp. 1990); Missouri Declarations, Life
Support, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (Vernon Supp. 1990); Montana Living Will Act, 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50 9 101 to -206 (1989); Nevada Withholding or Withdrawal of Life­
Sustaining Procedures, NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 449.540-.690 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1989); 
New Hampshire Terminal Care Document, N.H. REv. STAT. AN. §§ 137-H:l to :16 (Supp. 
1989); New Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24 7 1 to -11 (1986); North 
Carolina Right to Natural Death; Brain Death, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90 320 to -323 (1989); 
North Dakota Uniform Rights of Terminally III Act, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4 01 to -14 
(Supp. 1989); Oklahoma Natural Death Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West 
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also was the leader in enacting second generation living wills, durable 
powers of attorney for health care.16 Thirty-two states have adopted 
second generation living willsl7 and further adoptions are almost cer­
tain. In addition, general durable power of attorney laws were pressed 
into similar service in several states by amendments expressly providing 
that the laws govern health care decisions as well. IS Finally, a third 
round of lawsl9 recently has been passed appointing members of the 
Supp. 1990); Oregon Directive to Physician, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.605-.650 (Supp. 1990); 
South Carolina Death with Dignity Act, S.C. CODE AN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. 
Supp. 1989); South Dakota Health Care Consent Procedures, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS AN. §§ 
34-12C-l to -8 (Supp. 1990); Tennessee Right to a Natural Death Act (Living Wi1Is), TENN. 
CoDE AN. §§ 32-1 1-101 to -110 (Supp. 1990); Texas Natural Death Act, TEx. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE AN. §§ 672.001-.021 (Vernon Supp. 1990); Utali Personal Choice and Living 
Wi1I Act, UTAH CODE AN. §§ 75-2-1 101 to -1118 (Supp. 1989); Vermont Terminal Care 
Document, VT. STAT. AN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); Natural Death Act of Virginia, VA. 
CoDE AN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (1988 & Supp. 1990); Washington Natural Death Act, WASH. 
REv. CODE AN. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (Supp. 1990); West Virginia Natural Death Act, W. VA. 
CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1985); Wisconsin Natural Death Act, WIS. STAT. AN. §§ 154.01-.15 
(West 1989); Wyoming Living Wi1I Act, WYo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -109 (1988). 
16. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 240 (West Supp. 1989). 
17. See ARK. STAT. AN. § 20-17-202 (1989); CAL. Crv. CODE § 2431 (West Supp. 1990); 
DEL. CODE AN. tit. 16, § 2502 (1983); D.C. CODE AN. § 21-2201 (1989); 1990 Fla. Laws 
223; GA. CODE AN. § 31-36-1 (Harrison 1990); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (1990); ILL. AN. 
STAT. ch. 1 10 1/2, para. 802-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990): IND. CODE AN. § 16.8-12-5 (Bums 
1990); IOWA CODE AN. § 144A.7(1)(a) (West 1989); 1989 Kan. Sess. Laws 181: 1990 Ky. 
Acts 123; LA. REv. STAT. AN. § 40:1299.58.1 (West Supp. 1990); ME. REv. STAT. AN. tit. 
18-A, § 5-501 (Supp. 1990); MD. EsT. & TRUSTS CODE AN. § 13-601 (1981); MIN. STAT. 
AN. § 145(B).01 (West Supp. 1990); MISs. CODE AN. § 41-41-151 (Supp. 1990); NEV. REv. 
STAT. AN. § 449.810 (Michie Supp. 1989); 1990 N.Y. Laws 752; OHIO REv. CODE AN. § 
1337.12 (Baldwin Supp. 1989); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.510 (Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-
4.10-1 (1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS AN. § 59-7-2.5 (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE AN. § 34-6-
202 (Supp. 1990); TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. AN. art. 4590h-l (Vernon Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE 
AN. §§ 75-2-1 105 to -1106 (Supp. 1989); VT. STAT. AN. tit. 14, § 3453 (1989); VA. CODE 
AN. § 54.1-2986(2) (1988); WASH. REv. CODE AN. § 1 1.94.046 (Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE 
§ 16-30A-3 (Supp. 1990); 1989 Wis. Laws 200; WYo. STAT. § 35-22-102 (1988). 
These laws differ from state to state in several significant respects, some of which are 
addressed below. 
18. See LA. REv. STAT. AN. § 40:1299.58.1 (West Supp. 1990); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 18-A, § 5-501 (Supp. 1990); WASH. REv. CODE AN. § 1 1.94.046 (Supp. 1990). 
19. See CONN. GEN. STAT. AN. § 19a-571 (West Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE AN. § 21-
2210 (1989); FLA. STAT. AN. § 744.304 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE § 39-4303 
(1985); IND. CODE AN. § 16-8-3-3 (Bums 1990); IOWA CODE AN. § 255.11 (West 1985); 
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE AN. § 20-107 (1990); N.M. STAT. AN. § 24-7-8.1 (1986); N.Y. 
PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2972 (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (1985); S.C. CODE 
AN. § 44-77-10 to -80 (Law. Co-op. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS AN.·§ 34-12C-3 (Supp. 
1990); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE AN. § 672.009 (Vernon Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE AN. 
§ 75-2-1 107 (Supp. 1990); VA. CODE AN. § 54.1-2986 (1988); WASH. REv. CODE AN. § 
7.70.065 (Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE § 16-5c-5a (Supp. 1990). 
These family consent laws allow the appointment of specified family members as health 
care surrogates without court intervention. 
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family as health surrogates in the absence of a prior writing by an 
incompetent patient.20 
Of course, advance directives are not necessary for everyone. To 
the extent that one trusts the conservatorship process, there is little 
cause to make a directive, aside from avoiding the expense of ob­
taining the conservatorship appointment. Thus, a directive requiring 
acts that would not be expected from a conservator should be treated 
as a probable rejection of the conservatorship remedy. For example, 
directions to buy speculative stocks, to sell personal jewelry absent 
financial pressure to do so, to administer experimental drugs or per­
form experimental surgery, and certainly to remove life support would 
seem to indicate a knowing choice of outcomes that could not be ex­
pected from state administration. 
A patient may create an advance directive merely to inform phy­
sicians of the patient's wishes, but that effort is hardly worthwhile if 
the desired treatment is ordinary care. To the extent a patient makes 
a choice among acceptable alternatives, the patient appears also to 
make a decision not to allow others to make that choice. Even if a 
patient makes a directive out of concern that the state would not deal 
with her medical needs by appointing a conservator, such a directive 
probably would be limited to facilitating the appointment of either a 
conservator or an agent. She thereby could not account for other pro­
visions. Thus, having made a directive, especially a detailed one, a 
person should be assumed to have chosen self-direction over pater­
nalistic care. As a corollary, the state should not impose a conservator 
in the alleged best interests of the ward since the ward has indicated 
that she considers the directive to be a superior method of guiding 
care.21 
Probate is an apt analogy here.22 Probate law provides for two 
forms of distribution upon death. If a person cares to have control 
over how the estate is distributed, she writes a will. There are nu­
merous limits on what can be directed,23 but in the main, property 
passes as the testator wished. If there is no valid will, the state provides 
20. The list of cases is growing in which courts attempt to achieve a result appropriate 
for a particular patient without the benefit of an advance directive. For a discussion of these 
cases, see Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 86 92. 
2 1 .  This analysis depends on whether the maker understands the consequences of her acts 
and knows about available alternatives. If this is an incorrect assumption about a substantial 
number of present directives, it certainly would become a more correct assumption under the 
author's proposed new law. 
22. See Premature Probate, supra note 7, at 1018. 
23. For example, a testator may not intentionally omit a surviving spouse from her will 
or bequeath the family house to the detriment of her surviving spouse and children. J. RITCHIE. 
N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND. DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 146. 152. 182 (7th ed. 1989). 
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for distribution by intestacy.24 The state's purpose is to get property 
into the right hands and to settle the estate by using the state's con­
ception of what most people would (or should) want. If one likes the 
state's distribution scheme there is little reason to expend the time and 
money to make a will. 
Most states appear to have modelled advance directives in this 
manner. Several expressly have indicated that the purpose of the di­
rective is to avoid conservatorship or have provided ways to avoid the 
interference of a conservator if one is appointed.2S Others have adopted 
the contrary position and have subordinated an agent appointed by 
a directive to a conservator. 26 Subordination, of course, invalidates the 
choice not to accept statutory solutions because the conservator likely 
will be bound to the state's general principles governing conserva­
torship rather than to the terms of the advance directive. At a min­
imum, the maker is deprived of the choice of administrator and, 
consequently, the guarantee of her chosen outcomes. 
Subordination should run in the opposite direction. If a person 
appoints an agent under an advance directive, a court should appoint 
a conservator, if at all, only for matters not governed by the directive. 
Since conservatorship is established for those who cannot properly 
arrange for their needs, making an advance directive that appoints a 
person to satisfy needs arguably obviates the need for an additional 
appointment.27 
Of course, conservatorship can be viewed and actually can func­
tion as a means of checking abuses by durable power agents or phy­
sicians. As a solution to the problem of abuse, however, conservatorship 
is grossly overbroad. Other ways exist to chasten errant delegatees. 
Statutes generally provide for court review of the handling of an ad­
vance directive on a petition supported by evidence of abuse.28 Fi­
nancial agents routinely are required to give accountings as conservators 
presently are required to do.29 The directive itself might require the 
agent to be accountable to a named person or group on penalty of 
losing the agency in favor of an alternate agent. If a maker is par­
ticularly concerned about interference with her wishes, however, there 
24. Id. at 8S. 
2S. See, e.g., GA. CODE .AN. § 31-36-6(c) (Harrison 1990). 
26. See, e.g. , COLO. REv. STAT. § IS-18-112 (1989); MIN. STAT . .AN. § 14SB.03 subdiv. 
3 (West SUpp. 1990). 
' 
27. Cf. In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Il. 2d 361, 374, 20S N.E.2d 43S, 443 (196S) (holding 
that it is unconstitutional to appoint a conservator without notifying a patient to obtain 
consent to a blood transfusion if such transfUSIOns are against the patient's religion). 
28. See, e.g. , CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 2431-2444 (West Supp. 1991). 
29. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 2620 (West Supp. 1991). 
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should be a method (though not an easy one) for making an advance 
directive unchallengeable. For example, one might borrow from the 
California Durable Power of Attorney law30 the provision rendering 
difficult a challenge to the directive if an attorney has attested that 
she has fully informed the maker of the meaning of its provisions.3) 
Also, the state should allow the potential ward to nominate a con­
servator if one is to be appointed.32 One can anticipate and block some 
overreaching by disqualifying people such as health care providers and 
nursing home operators from accepting agency in an advance direc­
tiveY Naturally, any such disqualification deprives the maker of some 
degree of free choice, but the disqualification can be justified by the 
anticipated conflict of interest that otherwise might result. 
Although most of the present legislative restrictions to autono­
mous choice are contained in natural death acts, there are similar com­
plications in the durable powers of attorney statutes as well.34 The 
principal focus of many of these restrictions has been on what is pop­
ularly called the right to die.35 As impediments to autonomous choice, 
these restrictions must be reexamined. 
To be sure, each state has an interest in the life and welfare of 
its citizens. The state's interest in a patient's life, according to the 
United States Supreme Court, is compelling.36 Since many issues con­
cerning the health care of incompetent patients, especially life support 
termination, are complex and difficult, it is understandable that var­
ious states arrive at different compromises among competing inter­
estsY The clashing viewpoints on life support termination make it 
unlikely that there will be universal agreement.38 The fact that most 
30. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2400 2423 (West Supp. 1991). 
3 1 .  See id. § 2421.  
32. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.03 subdiv. 3 (West 1989). 
33. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 3 1 36 5(b) (Harrison 1990). 
34. See, e.g. , CAL. Cry. CODE § 2435 (West Supp. 1991) (A durable power of attorney 
may not authorize the attorney in fact to consent to commitment of the principal to a mental 
health facility, or to consent to shock therapy, psychosurgery, sterilization, or abortion on 
behalf of the principal.). 
35. For example, some states restrict the removal of hydration and nutrition or require 
that patients be terminally iII before a directive's provisions apply. See generally Mayo, 
Constitutionalizing the "Right to Die," 49 MD. L. REv. 103 (1990) (arguing that the consti­
tutional right of privacy does not extend to decisions made on behalf of permanently 
unconscious patients to have life-sustaining treatment discontinued and that continued state 
supervision is appropriate). 
36. See generally Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 1 10 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) 
(upholding a state's right to require clear and convincing evidence of a patient's wish in 
proceedings in which a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration of a person 
diagnosed to be in a persistent vegetative state). 
37. See Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 77 79. 
38. See Note, I Have a Conscience, Too: The Plight of Medical Personnel Confronting 
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(perhaps all) states agree that a terminal patient who desires treatment 
stopped and has clearly and competently so indicated has a right to 
refuse further medical aid39 provides support for at least a provision 
of this type in a new law. Claims of a state interest in life or preventing 
suicide seem fairly feeble in this context.4O 
There are, of course, other concerns about authorizing patient 
autonomy respecting the right to die. Aside from the strong moral and 
religious opposition,41 such permission might lead to disguised murder. 
More commonly, it surely would create psychological pressure on the 
patient to stop the expense, both financial and emotional, that critical 
care usually represents. Still, with medical science increasingly capable 
of keeping patients alive artificially, the incidence of the need to make 
life termination decisions increases.42 Presently, seventy percent of the 
deaths occurring at a hospital result from the termination of treat­
ment.43 
The disabled may warrant special concern. Representatives of the 
disable� have led the opposition to any easing of the life support re­
moval bans Oet alone promoting euthanasia) on the ground that de­
valuing life will result in their charges' harm.44 At the least, treatment 
will be less heroic; perhaps there will be stronger pressure to accept 
the desirability of ending the lives of the disabled. The specter of the 
Nazis' elimination of those they called unworthy of life springs to 
mind.4s It may be true of the elderly, in general, that to ease an end 
to life is to jeopardize life. No easy answer exists to such problems 
except alertness to their possibility. Ultimately, the danger of their 
eventuation must be weighed against the pain of keeping those alive 
who have decided rationally, without outside pressure, that death with 
dignity is preferred. To the author, the latter seems the more difficult 
choice to make. 
the Right to Die, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 699, 710 (1990) (authored by Irene Prior Loftus) 
(discussing Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988), wherein the individual patient's' 
self-determination interest was held to outweigh the state's interest in preserving life, preventing 
suicide, protecting innocent third parties, and maintaining the integrity of medical ethics); see 
also Beschle, supra note 1, at 333 (noting that theoretically diverse approaches of Massachusetts 
and New York courts on treatment termination both essentially require the court to determine 
the choice an incompetent would make were she competent). 
39. See Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 86; Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851. 
40. See Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 79, 97. 
41. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853. 
42. See Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 69, 97. 
43. Dying: Fear of Being Suspended in a Vegetative State Has Triggered an Unprecedented 
Demand for Living Wills Since High Court Ruling, L.A. Times, July 17, 1990, at El, col. 4. 
44. See Peters, The State's Interest in the Preservation of Life: From Quinlan to Cruzan, 
50 Omo ST. L.J. 891, 93845 (1989). 
45. K. BINDING & A. HOCHE, DIE FREWABE DER-VERNICHTUNG LEBENSUNWERTEN LEBENS 
(Leipzig' 1920). 
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An additional countervailing interest is sometimes urged on behalf 
of dependent children.46 The loss of support gets little consideration 
in most life support termination cases because the former supporter 
generally cannot assist the dependent child either financially or psy­
chologically because of imminent death. A notable exception is that 
a majority of states bar the termination of the life supporting care of 
a pregnant woman.47 A few limit such negation of the woman's choice 
to pregnancies involving viable fetuses or fetuses that could develop 
to viability. 48 The latter seem in line with the present constitutional 
resolution of the abortion question.49 The majority of states, which 
negate an advance directive that would lead to the maker's death, seem 
dubious. So long as women remain free to choose to have an abortion 
in the first trimester for any reason or none at all, imposing a higher 
standard of review on terminal patients appears to violate constitu­
tional privacy doctrine as it now stands. 
Can it be true that a state has a sufficient interest in a pregnancy 
(even one likely doomed by the ill health of the mother) to force a 
prospective mother to carry a child whom she probably will not have 
46. See Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College. Inc .• 331 F.2d 
1000 (D.C. Cir.). cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (sustaining a hospital's administration of 
emergency blood transfusion to a patient whose religious convictions prohibited such measures 
and whose husband refused to authorize transfusion on similar grounds, when the hospital 
was exposed to potential civil and criminal liability for failing to take appropriate action, 
when the patient was the mother of a seven month old child whose "abandonment" it was in 
the state's interest to prevent, and when the patient's  voluntary presence in the hospital gave 
rise to the inference that she wanted her life preserved though she could not "consent" to the 
means of doing it). 
47. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36 3205 (1986); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 
(West Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a 574 (West Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 16, § 2503 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.08 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-44103 
(Harrison Supp. 1989); HAW. REv. STAT. § 327D-6 (Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 
(Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8 1 1 1 1 (Burns 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 103 (1985); 
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5 605 (1990); MISS. CODE AN . § 41-41 107 (Supp. 1990); 
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.025 (Vernon Supp. 1990); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 449.61 0  (Michie 
1986); N.H. REV. STAT. AN. § 1 37 H:14 (Supp. 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23 06.4 03 (Supp. 
1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3 103 (West Supp. 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44 77 70 (Law. 
Co op. Supp. 1989); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.019 (Vernon 1990); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 75 2-1 109 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70. 122.030 (Supp. 1990); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 15 14.03 (West 1989). 
48. See ALAsKA STAT. § 18.12.040 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20 17 206 (Supp. 1989); 
COLO. REv. STAT. § 1 5 18 104 (1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10 112, para. 703 (Smith Hurd 
Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.6 (West 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9 202 (1989); 
UNIF. RIGHTS OF TERMINALLY ILL ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 75 (Supp. 1990). 
49. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (upholding state 
statute requiring physicians to perform fetal viability tests on women believed to be at least 
twenty weeks pregnant); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 1 13 (1973) (subsequent to viability. state may 
regulate and even proscribe abortion except when necessary to preserve the life or health of 
the mother). 
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a chance to nourish? Can the state constitutionally choose between 
the two lives and cause the woman's death by procedures designed to 
save the child? 
Under Roe v. Wade, the state must consider not only the mother's 
physical burden of the period of gestation but also the mother's in­
terest in the life she may bring into the world.50 Until a state can es­
tablish a right to interfere in a healthy person's decision not to give 
birth, the state shou1d not be allowed to require a woman to give birth 
to a child doomed to be motherless. At the moment, the law seems 
to bar a state from merely inquiring about the reason for a woman's 
decision if she is a competent adult. 
Many courts, however, have long recognized an additional in­
terest in the medical profession that impinges on the rights of pa­
tients.51 If physicians, in general, or the specific treating physician object 
to a cal to cease treatment, that objection often is entitled to some 
weight. A majority of states have addressed the possible conflict be­
tween the treating physician and the patient by providing in their phy­
sician directive laws for the transfer of a patient by a doctor offended 
by the patient's wishes.52 In many states, however, this conflict remains 
unresolved by statute. Although physicians ordinarily are involved in 
treatment and, thus, in treatment cessation, their most pressing in­
terests should be satisfied if they are not required to participate in 
treatment cessation to which they are opposed. A fair balance between 
50. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
51. See, e.g. , Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 589·91 (D.R.I. 1988) (The integrity of 
medical ethics is subordinate to the wishes of the patient. If prompt transfer of the patient to 
a facility that would respect the patient's wishes is impractical, the objecting hospital must 
terminate nutrition and hydration.); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 
N.E.2d 626 (1986) (Hospital should not be compelled to withhold food and water contrary to 
generally established and accepted medical principles to comply with guardian's wishes. Hospital 
must assist guardian in transferring ward to suitable facility where guardian's wishes may be 
effected.). 
' 
52. See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-8 (1990); ALAsKA STAT. § 18.12.050 (1986); ARIz. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 36-3204 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-207 (Supp. 1989); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 7191 (West Supp. 1990); COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-18-113 (1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-
2427 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.09 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-4108 (Harrison 
1986); HAw. REv. STAT. § 3270-11 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-4508 (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. 
STAT. ch. 110 112, para. 703 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.8 (West 
1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,107 (1985); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2926 (Supp. 
1989); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-604 (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.06 (West 
Supp. 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-1 15 (Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.030 (Vernon 
Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-203 (1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:6 (Supp. 
1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-08 (Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1 1-108 (Supp. 
1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1112 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2987 (1988); WASH. REv. 
CODE ANN. § 70.122.060 (Supp. 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.07 (West 1989); WYo. STAT. 
§ 35-22-104 (1988). 
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the pain of a dying patient and a physician's moral code would seem 
to justify depriving an offended physician of a more decisive role. A 
new act should explicitly adopt the transfer requirements already in 
use in a number of states. 
Present natural death acts were not written to be all-inclusive. 
They typically recite that they do not affect other rights.53 The natural 
death acts were born of a problem newly realized and are riddled with 
restrictions presumably attributable to excessive caution and lack of 
experience. 54 As a result, express provisions were made for the pos­
sibility of less restrictive treatment at common law. In contrast to the 
natural death acts, durable powers actually were borrowed from estate 
practice, a field in which they were not a novelty. In asset manage­
ment, durable powers generally carry few restrictions;55 thus, although 
only the basic durable power law has been adopted, few legislative 
restrictions attach to health care provisions. In the laws specifically 
passed to deal with health care, some of the excessive caution of nat­
ural death acts was carried forward. 56 As a general matter, however, 
these laws are still much less restrictive than natural death actsY 
It is a current curiosity that the strictures of natural death acts 
can be avoided by not making a directive at a1l58 or by creating a du­
rable power. Since the passage of the early natural death acts, there 
has been extensive examination of treatment termination issues. Ap­
pellate courts have written thoughtful opinions on the subject to guide 
lower courtS.59 Currently, there are enough carefully reasoned opinions 
that each state should be capable of writing a clearer, more compre­
hensive statute. 
Natural death acts focus on instructions to physicians. A new law 
should have provisions with the same focus. These provisions specif­
ically might contain whatever restrictions the state wishes to impose 
on self-determination of death, permitting options and dropping the 
present statement that these options are not in derogation of other 
rights. Presumably, by drawing on a number of court decisions re­
solving such issues, these restrictions could be significantly less on­
erous than those in present natural death acts. At least the statutes 
53. See, e.g. , TENN. CODE ANN. § 32 11 110 (Supp. 1990); w. VA. CODE § 16 30-9 (1985). 
54. See, e. g. , FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.08 (West 1986) (prohibiting the discontinuation of 
medical treatment if the patient is pregnant). 
55. WRITING A LIVING WILL, supra note 7, at 50. 
56. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2436.5 (West Supp. 1991) (requiring renewal of durable 
power for health care every seven years). 
57. See supra note 17. 
58. In re Estate of Greenspan, 137 Ill. 2d I, 25-28, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1202-03 (1990). 
59. Many of the cases are reviewed in Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 78-92. 
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should be sufficiently flexible to encourage rather than deter the cre­
ation of directives. 
With respect to a wish to have life support terminated, present 
natural death act statutes (and even durable power for health care 
laws) tend to be quite limited. For example, although statutes generally 
allow the removal of respirators and ventilators and the request for 
do-not-resuscitate orders by advance directive, most stop short of au­
thorizing means of effecting what is popularly known as death with 
dignity.60 No statute authorizes lethal injection, for example, even un­
der circumstances in which a patient may die by withholding medical 
aid. Many physician directive statutes forbid the termination of hy­
dration and nutrition even when food and liquids are administered by 
intubation.61 These statutes intentionally discriminate between persons 
who have a mortal dependency on medical treatment and those who 
will survive if normal needs for food and shelter are provided. Al­
though courts generally have placed tubal nutrition and hydration in 
the medical treatment category,62 physician directive statutes often ap­
pear to prohibit any form of terminating the supply of food and liq­
uids.63 
It is curious that physician directive statutes that were spawned 
by the plight of Karen Quinlan would not have helped resolve her case. 
She, as many after her, was in a coma and might have survived for 
an indefinite period so long as food and fluids were continued.64 As 
it turned out, she did not, but many patients in persistent vegetative 
states may live for decades in that condition, given shelter, food, and 
60. See, e.g., CAL. av. CODE § 2443 (West Supp. 1991) (prohibiting provisions for mercy 
killing or suicide). 
61. A:LA. CODE § 22-8A-3 (1990); ALAsKA STAT. § 18.12.040 (1990); ARIz. REv. STAT. 
AN. § 36-3201 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-206 (Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 19a-570 (West Supp. 1990); D.C. CoDE ANN. § 6-2421 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03 
(West 1986); GA. CoDE ANN. § 84-4102 (Harrison 1986); HAw. REv. STAT. § 327D-4 (Supp. 
1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 112, para. 703 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 
16-8-11-4 (Bums 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.2 (West 1989); JUN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,102 
(1985); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2922 (Supp. 1989); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 
5-602 (1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010 (Vernon Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202 
(1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:2 (Supp. 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02 (Supp. 
1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3102 (West Supp. 1990); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.605 (Supp. 
1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103 
(Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1103 (1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.01 (West 1989); 
WYo. STAT. § 35-22-101 (1988). 
62. See Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 82. 
63. See, e.g. , N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:2 (Supp. 1989) (life sustaining procedures 
that may be terminated "shall not include the administration of medication, sustenance, or 
the performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide comfort or eliminate 
pain"). 
64. Friedrich, A Limited Right to Die, TIME, Jui. 9, 1990, at 59. 
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liquids.65 A few states expressly permit the inclusion of a provision 
to terminate food and liquids along with other directives but do not 
prohibit such acts without this provision.66 Some of these states limit 
removal authority to documents that expressly so directY 
The result, in any event, is curious. Depending upon the form of 
statute and the type of patient need, some may have their suffering 
ended by using a directive while others may not. If nothing short of 
ending feeding and the supply of liquids will result in death, even pa­
tients in states permitting directives to include hydration and nutrition 
removal will probably at best die slowly by dehydration. Physicians 
are directed to make the patients as comfortable as possible during 
that time.68 Nonetheless, the procedure appears cruel, which suggests 
it eventually may be replaced with a more palatable alternative. Active 
euthanasia is, of course, still extremely controversial. 69 
Even one of the least controversial forms of treatment for ter­
minal patients, do-not-resuscitate orders, may raise difficult problems. 
For a variety of reasons, a number of terminally ill people prefer to 
die outside of hospitals. They may wish to refuse treatment should 
they have heart failure or otherwise be stricken while at home or in 
a public place.70 In such circumstances, do-not-resuscitate orders may 
be demanded in advance directives. These orders should not be dif­
ficult to implement in a hospital. In public, on the other hand, they 
become very hard to enforce. Emergency medical personnel under­
standably are trained indiscriminately to resuscitate and transport the 
victim to a medical facility. Even if other problems concerning the 
appropriateness of refusal of life support are solved, it may be un­
reasonable for a person who lives in our society to expect not to be 
treated if stricken ill in a public place. The core of the problem is not 
65. [d. 
66. See IDAHO CODE § 39 4504 (Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.03 (West Supp. 
1990). 
67. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18 104 (1989 & Supp. 1990). 
68. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 112, para. 703 (Smith
Hurd Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2925 (Supp. 1989). 
69. But see Bouvia v. Superior Ct., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1147, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 
307 (1986) (Compton, J., concurring). Compton stated, 
[d. 
The right to die is an integral part of our right to control our own destinies so long 
as the rights of others are not affected. That right should, in my opinion, include 
the ability to enlist assistance from others, including the medical profession, in 
making death as painless and quick as possible. 
70. See, e.g., New York's Do-Not Resuscitate Law, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960, 
2978 (McKinney Supp. 1990). 
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legal but practical. Emergency forces have enough to do without be­
coming concerned with the state of advance directives when they arrive 
at the scene. Yet important reasons may justify allowing terminal pa­
tients who can do so to leave hospitals if they wish. For example, 
discharging these patients may free needed space, be less expensive, 
and allow more contact with loved ones. It seems more civilized to 
allow terminal patients a final surrounding of choice rather than the 
forced interior of an institution. 
One might devise a way to wear identification indicating the wish 
not to be resuscitated, but that probably would be ineffective. Emer­
gency personnel might well wonder whether the decision was made 
legally and correctly and even who attached the identification. Emer­
gency personnel might want medical input. A registration system with 
a central emergency center might handle the problem. Once an ap­
propriate do-not-resuscitate order is issued, the patient would receive 
an identification with an index number to be carried on the person 
of the patient. The identification could be discovered (ideally by the 
person calling for emergency aid) and a radio check on its validity and 
the identifying characteristics of the person who made the advance 
directive could be obtained from the registry. The check potentially 
could be completed before arrival at the scene. At worst, it could be 
initiated immediately on contact by emergency personnel. A registra­
tion system should be legislatively authorized. 71 
Even under the circumstances most favorable to following an ad­
vance directive, it does not seem likely that a state legislature would 
enact a statute that allows lethal injection. Assisting suicide generally 
is a criminal act despite the direction of the person who dies.72 In most 
of the civilized world, assisted dying is prohibited.73 
The Netherlands is a notable exception:74 euthanasia is well es­
tablished, but at least at the moment, there appears to be no provision 
for assisting foreigners wishing to die. Perhaps that will change. Per­
haps other countries will adopt the position of the Netherlands. Pos­
sibly some states will enact an assisted suicide law. Recently, such an 
initiative was proposed in California, but did not make the ballot. 75 
71. Santa Cruz County, California, has a system for processing advance directives. The 
911 emergency operator checks a fIle for registered physician directives before dispatching 
emergency aid. 
72. See Peters, supra note 44, at 963. 
73. See generally Death by Directive, supra note 7. 
74. 60 Minutes: The Last Right? (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 5, 1986); Washington 
State Confronts Euthanasia, Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 1991, at A7, col. 2. 
75. Proposed "Humane and Dignified Death Act," November 1988. 
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Public opinion polls seem to favor a similar type of provision for the 
terminally ill. 76 
If a terminally ill person could travel to a place in which active 
assistance in dying was provided, would advance directives be allowed 
to authorize transportation of the maker for that purpose? This prob­
lem might be anticipated in drafting current documents. 
Of course, treatment cessation is not the only issue of concern. 
While directives to physicians are limited to life support instructions, 
durable powers of attorney also can direct the many medical (and fi­
nancial) issues that can be anticipated to arise on incapacity. An im­
proved advance directive law should allow the maker this option as 
well. After all, incompetents may well require a variety of treatments, 
and there is no reason to require the appointment of either an agent 
or conservator to insure that physicians serve the patient as the patient 
wishes. To ensure that the broader potential does not delay addressing 
issues relating to dying, the law should allow codicils to expand the 
original directive like will codicils.77 
At the same time, teeth should be put into directives to physicians. 
So long as the medical community ignored advance directives, the di­
rectives could be seen as either useless or only marginally effective.78 
Such a perception was likely to become self-fulfilling. Life support is 
almost invariably supplied in hospitals. Increasingly, the primary site 
of death is hospitals.79 Physicians appear generally to believe that treat­
ment decisions are theirs to make; some even believe that they have 
interests which must be balanced against the wishes of their patients. 
Some courts agree.80 
Undoubtedly, the recent congressional passage of provisions con­
cerning advance directives will address these problems. The Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 199081 requires Medicare providers to 
take � active role in informing patients about their right to participate 
in and direct health care decisions and requires providers to encourage 
and honor advance health care directives. It further mandates that 
each provider maintain written policies82 ensuring that patients are given 
written notice of their rights to control medical treatment under state 
76. Right to Die: The Publics View, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1990, at A18, col. 2 (810J0 of 
persons polled would allow a feeding tube to be removed from a comatose individual with no 
brain activity upon the request of family). 
77. See J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, supra note 23, at 7. 
78. See Mayo, supra note 35, at 146. 
79. Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 69. 
80. Note, supra note 38, at 707 n.53. 
81. Pub. L. No. 101 508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990). 
82. [d. § 4206(f)(1). 
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law, including the right to make an advance directive,83 and that pa­
tients' medical records are marked to indicate whether advance di­
rectives exist.84 To ensure that decisions are made freely, the act 
prohibits conditioning medical care (or otherwise discriminating) on 
whether such a directive has been executed.8s Finally, the Act provides 
that the provider must ensure compliance with both common law and 
statutory state law respecting advance directives86 and educate the staff 
and the community about advance directives.87 When the law becomes 
effective in 1992, its impact on issues discussed in this Article should 
be substantial. 
States may want further to support patient control. To that end 
the proposed law might criminalize the refusal to follow a proper di­
rective and make refusal actionable by private injunctive proceedings. 
Awarding attorney fees to the winning party may be justifiable and 
would dissuade harassing law suits against physicians while enabling 
agents without ample resources to pursue actions. Whether these ad­
ditional enforcement measures are required might be best assessed af­
ter the federal law has had a chance to alter present practices. The 
routine inquiry about directives by hospitals and others should reduce 
the apprehension that patients presently exhibit. 
One of the most promising aspects of the congressional provision 
is its requirement that medical staffs be educated about advance di­
rectives. If physicians become better informed, they may become ef­
fective promoters of such documents. At the moment, physicians are 
not well informed. One study found that eighty-five percent of Cal­
ifornia physicians surveyed either knew nothing or little about advance 
directives.88 It is appropriate to urge a patient to consider making an 
advance directive incident to a routine hospital admissions.89 The rou­
tine exercise of the request will lessen its threatening nature. 
Of course, the necessity for a directive stems from the incapacity 
of the principal. Some states prohibit anyone from exercising health 
care powers while the maker is competent.90 Al states allow a com-
83. Id. § 4206(f)(I)(a)(i). 
84. Id. § 4206(f)(1)(B). 
85. Id. § 4206(f)(1)(C). 
86. Id. § 4206(f)(I)(O). 
87. Id. § 4206(f)(1)(E). 
88. Zinberg, Decisions for the Dying: An Empirical Study of Physician's Responses to 
A dvance Directives, 13 VT. L. REv. 445, 472 (1989). 
89. Lowry, Led by Court, Hospitals Take New Interest in Living Wills, N.Y. Times, July 
23, 1990, at AI, col. 1.  
90. See, e. g. , CAL. CIV. CODE § 2434 (West Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 
1990); W. VA. CODE § 13-30A-3 (Supp. 1990). 
772 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42 
petent maker to revoke the instrument. A greater problem exists with 
respect to a maker who, though now legally incompetent, wishes to 
change a directive. 
Some statutes at least allow the revocation of authority to remove 
life support if the patient can communicate, irrespective of whether 
he or she is then thought to be competent.91 At a minimum, a new 
statute should have such a provision. Decisions about competency are 
controversial. They should not be allowed to interfere with an an­
nounced decision not to die. After all, had the patient not given au­
thority for a contrary position, life would have been maintained as 
a routine application of state law. 
The result of revoking the authority to remove life support, how­
ever, is permanent. If an incompetent patient revokes, the presumption 
of competence cannot be used to revive the document or make a new 
one. There is, in other words, relatively easy revocation but not easy 
reinstatement. Although that rule is symmetrical, it is not sensible. The 
states presume competency revocation, defying the customary treat­
ment of incompetency for strong policy reasons. The reasons for al­
lowing patient self-determination are also strong. There are alternatives 
to voiding the document because of a change of mind. For example, 
the document might be considered suspended by the change of mind 
and the suspension dropped if the patient again sought its ends. The 
absence of continued resistance might end the suspension. Family or 
courts might be empowered to reinstate the document, even absent 
competent consent, subject to the patient's refusal assuming that the 
patient is in a condition to communicate refusal. Thus, the deliberate, 
competently chosen outcome would prevail over the effects of hesi­
tation. 
A related problem is whether states will require that advance di­
rectives be reexecuted periodically or whether they will allow older 
documents to govern conduct at a significantly later time. Most states 
allow directives, once valid, to remain in force indefinitely.92 Cali­
fornia, however, requires their reexecution periodically.93 Periodic 
91. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.020 (1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2424 (1989); HAW. 
REv. STAT. § 3270 12 (Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3104 (Supp. 1990). 
92. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.05 (West 1989) (providing that a directive is valid 
unless revoked or superceded by the express wish of a competent patient). 
93. California requires physician directives to be reexecuted every five years. CAL. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1990) (California requires the reexecution of durable 
powers for health care only every seven years. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2436.5 (West Supp. 1990». 
Wisconsin and Idaho had similar requirements for physician directives but dropped them. 
IDAHO CODE § 39-4506 (1985) (current version at § 39.4507 (Supp. 1990»; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
1154.03 (West 1989). 
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reexecution is necessary only if a person remains cOIp.petent or regains 
competency. 
Most physician directive statutes also avoid the problem of out­
dated documents by requiring that the maker be in a terminal con­
dition at the time of execution.94 The original directive statute, enacted 
in California, takes an extreme view by requiring diagnosis of the ter­
minal condition two weeks before the document becomes binding.9s 
Colorado requires one week.96 Studies indicate that these waiting pro­
visions effectively bar most people from executing the document.97 
Desires expressed earlier in life or while in better health may over-? 
exaggerate the limitations that age and infirmity actually impose. 
Commonly, many persons happily accept' living with physical limi­
tations they once would have thought unbearable.98 Whether that sup­
ports dismissing an earlier writing is another matter. As the advance 
directive represents a position once formally adopted, it likely rep­
resents a deliberate position worthy of implementation. After all, it 
could have been revoked by the maker. Alternatively, an intermediate 
position could be adopted that would give the advance directive di­
minished effect with the passage of time.99 Longevity of the document 
alone does not justify completely disregarding the expressed views of 
the maker. 
The third generation advance directive should deal sensitively with 
this complex issue. Perhaps the best direction lies in requiring the maker 
to specify in the document any desired form of assistance in dying 
beyond suspension of medical machinery such as removal of tubal 
feeding or suspension of chemotherapy. It might be better to provide 
a substitute for starvation and dehydration as the only acceptable means 
of allowing a person not dependent on medical machinery to die. Once 
we confront the fact that removal of food and water kills all pa­
tients,l00 a form of more direct and less gruesome help can be accepted 
as an alternative. Careful screening would be required to ensure against 
the previously mentioned improprieties. 
94. Only Arkansas and Texas allow patients who are not in a terminal condition to 
execute advance directives. ARK. STAT. AN. § 20-17-202 (1987); TEx. REv. qv. STAT. AN. 
art. 4590h-l (Vernon Supp. 1991). 
95. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1990). 
96. COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-18-104 (Supp. 1990). 
97. Redleaf, The California Natural Death Act: A n  Empirical Study of Physicians' 
Practices, 31  STAN. L. REv. 913, 928 (1979). 
98. Peters, supra note 44, at 914. 
99. Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 WIS. L. REv. 737, 768 n.125. 
100. See Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 84. 
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A further word on the implementation of directives to allow dying 
is in order. Some consideration must be given to ensuring that a de­
cision to be allowed to die remains acceptable to the patient. Life sup­
port termination decisions may cause almost immediate death, as in 
the case of turning off a ventilator for a dependent patient. On the 
other hand, they may cause death more slowly, as in the case of the 
removal of a feeding tube.101 In the latter case, there appears to be 
no good reason for postponing action once it is determined that the 
decision was appropriately made and has not been repudiated. In the 
former, it may be wise to provide for a short term postponement to 
assure a cooling off period. During the cooling off period anyone who 
has the right to object to the procedure, including, of course, the pa­
tient if she can communicate, can effect a change in the cessation of 
treatment. Because many people who have made and confirmed a de­
cision to be allowed to die change their mind, the law should allow 
a short time, after all other hurdles are crossed, for sober last minute 
contemplation. 
Whatever choices are made concerning the issues discussed, du­
rable powers of attorney for health care should provide the model for 
providing instructions on health care. Comparable provisions should 
deal with asset management. No directive can be as effective as an 
agent charged with carrying out instructions. The concept is good and 
needs little adjustment, but it does require the maker both to craft 
a document and to find a trusted agent to make it work. Actually, 
regression might be in order because durable power laws were less 
complicated when they merely addressed asset management before the 
new class of health care durable power laws were passed. 
An additional problem of conflict of laws has not yet spawned 
reported cases. In an increasingly mobile society, it is unrealistic to 
expect that the drafter of advance directives necessarily will be in the 
state in which the document was drawn or, for that matter, in her then 
home state. A few statutes accommodate that problem by enforcing 
a document that is valid in the state in which it was made. 102 Minnesota 
accepts a directive that substantially complies with its own law.103 At 
the opposite extreme lie California and Oregon, which prescribe a form 
to be used or at least prescribe a number of necessary provisions that 
101 .  See id. at 84. 
102. ALASKA STAT. § 18-12.090 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-212 (Supp. 1989); ME. 
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2930 (Supp. 1989); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-612 (1990); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50 9 1 1 1  (1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3 103. 1  (Supp. 1991); VNlF. 
RIGHTS OF TERMINALLY ILL ACT § 13,  9B V.L.A. 80 (Supp. 1990). 
103. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.15  (West Supp. 1990). 
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might well be omitted in a draft prepared elsewhere.I04 Worse yet, the 
requirements of those states differ from each other. The requirement 
that specific provisions or forms be used does not foreclose a court 
from accepting a conflicting document made by persons not under the 
state's jurisdiction at the time. lOS 
The great majority of states do not prescribe the precise form or 
mandate the inclusion of specific provisions. They allow different forms 
and they do not resolve the conflicts of law question. Although their 
laws probably raise fewer problems than the restrictive states' statutes, 
they are not ideal either. The conflicts question is yet to be resolved, 
and it still remains open to the courts to refuse to enforce an out of 
state form. 
No state appears to require its courts to allow the appointment 
of an agent who, because she is located outside the state, may not be 
easily amenable to the state's laws. Although a court seemingly could 
condition enforcement of a directive on the agent's voluntary com­
pliance with state requirements, the uncertainties involved do not pro­
vide peace of mind for elders. The new law should contain a provision 
validating a directive that complies with the requirements of the mak­
er's state of domicile when the directive was made. The state also could 
impose other requirements from its own laws if the maker becomes 
a domiciliary. Even then, the document should at least be accepted 
in any legal proceeding as an indication of the maker's wishes. 
Natural death laws do not require the appointment of agents. 
That feature removes a nagging problem of durable powers of at­
torney. Many elders may have significant trouble finding a willing and 
able agent who is likely to remain healthy and competent. Many elders 
have no one. On the other hand, the presence of someone with legal 
authority to enforce the patient's wishes increases the likelihood of 
those wishes being effectuated. Although physicians must follow phy­
sician directives, patients by definition are incompetent to make-let 
alone enforce-their directives when the time comes. Because patients 
enforce their own mandates, many physicians likely control the med­
ical fate of their patients. 106 At least, elders may fear that their doc­
uments are ineffectual. 
104. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1990); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.610 
(Supp. 1990). 
105. Some statutes now so provide. See, e.g. , TEx. REv. Cxv. STAT. AN. art. 4S90h-l, 
sec. 13 (Vernon Supp. 1991). 
106. See Fear oj Being Suspended in a Vegetative State Has Triggered an Unprecedented 
Demand Jor Living Wills Since High Court Ruling, L.A. Times, July 17, 1990, at El, col. 4. 
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The third generation living will could resolve the problem by en­
larging the group of persons who are available for selection as at­
torney-in-fact. Since the primary reason for appointing an agent outside 
of available family probably is the avoidance of family interference 
with an elder's wishes, the agent need not be a close relative of the 
elder. It suffices that the person is willing to follow the provisions of 
the durable power and that she is competent to act. A corps of vol­
unteers willing to serve such a purpose might be relatively easy to de­
velop since there are already many models of community elder support. 
It would seem a worthy project for one of the many community-minded 
service organizations to adopt; perhaps funding for the organization 
of such groups might be appropriate. The sponsoring group could 
undertake training and supervision of volunteers. Laws should be 
amended to allow such organizations to be named as either the prin­
cipal agent or as an alternate agent in an advance directive.107 
At present, advance directives end at death. It might be wise to 
allow an agent-based directive to exist long enough for the agent to 
have an autopsy conducted as a means of enforcing predeath medical 
directives. lOS 
One commentator has suggested that the doctrine of cy pres might 
be adapted to give effect to a maker's perspectives given changed cir­
cumstances.109 Thus, the intent of the maker might be effectuated by 
substituting a feasible means of execution for one that has become 
impossible. 
The fact that only those with an advanced education are likely 
to use physician directives and powers of attorney supports finding 
an appropriate alternative. Physician directive and powers of attorney 
put a high premium on expression skills and on experience with legal 
documents.l Io Many people made wards under conservatorship laws 
107. Health care durable power of attorney laws generally require that the health agent be 
a named person. See, e.g., Oregon Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, OR. REv. 
STAT. §§ 127.505 .585 (1989). 
108. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31 36-7 (Harrison 1990) (agent may be empowered to 
make an anatomical gift, authorize an autopsy, or direct the disposition of a principal's 
remains); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10 112, para. 802-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (unless agency 
states an earlier termination date, the agency continues until the death of the principal); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 58-625 to -632 (Supp. 1989) (agent may make decisions about organ donation, 
autopsy, and disposition of the body); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.03 (West Supp. 1990) (since 
"health care" needs to cease at death, presumption must be that agency also ceases); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 34-6-201 (Supp. 1990) (health care is limited to treatment decisions, thus creating 
the presumption that the agency ends at death). 
109. Gelfand, supra note 99, at 794 n.254. 
1 10. Doing Justice to Life; For the Cruzans, Pain jor Principle, a Triumph, N.Y. Times, 
June 27, 1990, at A22, col. 1 .  
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likely do not possess either skill. 1 I l  If the law is to apply to all classes, 
the new law should provide alternative directions in the event that the 
dying person has never provided written directions. Of course, every 
effort should be made to facilitate the use of durable powers and di­
rectives, but not providing an adequate alternative is probably insen­
sitive to the differences among people. 
A significant problem lies in the small number of directives that 
presently are prepared. Death is an unpleasant subject that most peo­
ple avoid discussing or even considering. Although in a recent poll the 
majority of those questioned approved of living wills, only fifteen per­
cent had made one.112 On the other hand, fifty-six percent had in­
formed family members of their wishes.l13 The recently passed of federal 
law can be expected to increase the number of directives drawn. 
To some extent, it is inappropriate to require that people use these 
documents rather than other alternatives when the intent is to promote 
self-determination. More effort must be made, however, to lessen the 
burden of making directives. State-approved forms, already available 
in most states, 114 are useful especially if they do not limit the ability 
of the maker to direct conduct in other terms. These forms provide 
an inexpensive and uncomplicated means of preserving a person's 
wishes. 
Whether a thoughtful, literate person would adopt a form might 
depend on the extent to which that person had specific concerns that 
l l i .  In the New York study of guardianship, a large number of wards were state charges 
who, presumably, often would be undereducated. SUROGATE MANAGEMENT, supra note 7. 
1 12. L.A. Times, July 17, 1990, at El, col. 4. 
1 13 .  Developments in the Law Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARv. L. REv. 
1519, 1647 n.35 (1990). 
1 14. See ALA. CoDE § 22-8A-4 (1990); ALAsKA STAT. § 18.12.010 (1986); ARIz. REv. STAT. 
AN. § 36-3202 (1986); ARK. STAT. AN. § 20-17-202 (Supp. 1989); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1990); COLO. REv. STAT. AN. § 15-18-104 (1989); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 19a-575 (West Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE AN. § 6-2422 (1989); FLA. STAT. AN. § 
765.05 (West 1986); GA. CODE AN. § 31-32-3 (1986); HAw. REv. STAT. § 327D-4 (Supp. 
1989); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (Supp. 1990); ILL. AN. STAT. ch. 1 10 112, para. 703 (Smith­
Hurd Supp. 1990); IND. CoDE AN. § 16-8-11-12 (Bums 1990); IOWA CODE AN. § 144A.3 
(West 1989); KAN. STAT. AN. § 65-28,103 (1985); LA. REv. STAT. AN. § 40:1299:58.3 (West 
Supp. 1990); ME. REv. STAT. AN. tit. 22, § 2922 (Supp. 1989); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE 
AN. § 5-602 (1990); MrnN STAT. AN. § 145B.04 (West Supp. 1990); MIS. CODE AN. § 
41-41-107 (Supp. 1989); Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.015 (Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE AN. § 50-9-
103 (1989); NEV. REv. STAT. AN. § 449.610 (Michie 1986); N.H. REv. STAT. AN. § 137H:3 
(Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03 (Supp. 1989); 
OKLA. STAT. AN. tit. 63, § 3103 (West Supp. 1990); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.610 (Supp. 1990); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-50 (Law. Co op. Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE AN. § 32-1 1-105 (Supp. 
1990); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE AN. § 672.004 (Vernon Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE AN. 
§ 75-2-1104 (1990); VT. STAT. AN. tit. 18, § 5253 (1987); VA. CODE AN. § 54.1-2984 (1988); 
WASH. REv. CODE AN. § 70.122.030 (Supp. 1990); WYo. STAT. § 35-22-102 (1977); UNIF. 
RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALY ILL ACT § 2, 9B U.L.A. 70 (Supp. 1990). 
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would not be protected by the form. In that regard, it would be es­
pecially useful to have an authoritative interpretation of the form pro­
visions enacted along with them. While the interpretations would not 
be as binding as the language of the form, they would provide a first 
step in dealing with ambiguities. The issue is of sufficient importance 
to make form drafting the subject of educational campaigns. 
Finally, in the event that a person does not create a physician 
directive or durable power appointment, a statute could take care of 
problems without the necessity of court intervention. The new statute 
might continue to name the persons who would be empowered to act 
on behalf of the patient absent a directive and further be broadened 
to express the totality of health care the state would allow them to 
direct. Depending on the satisfaction with these provisions, a patient 
would choose whether to make an alternative document and, if so, 
what its provisions should be. Disagreement with the medical care pro­
visions provided in the new statute would trigger at least a physician 
directive. If a patient does not trust one of those persons empowered 
to act on her behalf, she could appoint an agent. 
Improvements in medical technology have made advance direc­
tives far more important than they would have been at an earlier time. l IS 
The authorizing laws have been passed quickly, but have not been 
coordinated with other state laws. Substantial overlap exists, and yet 
significant gaps exist as well. Cases relating to terminal care also have 
flourished in the past decade. It is a good time to differentiate and 
reorganize the laws that exist. A single package, especially one that 
spells out the results of failing to make a directive, would make di­
rectives more useful and, consequently, more likely to be used. 
l lS.  Death by Directive, supra note 7, at 69. 
